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Abstract Examines the emergence of environmental legislation and the response of
organizations. Most legal academics have attempted to explain these responses in the context of
rational choice theory, using an economic framework such as the rational polluter model. Argues
that whilst the rational polluter model offers a partial explanation of organizations’ behaviour in
response to environmental legislation, it does not explain why the majority of organizations are law
abiding. Examines work on legitimacy theory, and by drawing on that work and placing it in the
context of case law, suggests that it offers a better explanatory framework.
We probably know least about the most important and fundamental topic in enforcement –
why firms comply with the law (Cohen, 2000, p. 10251).
Introduction
Organizations operate within a range of legal frameworks. Many of these frameworks
were established to clarify and facilitate commercial activities. For example, contract
and company law. But other legal frameworks exist to control and regulate
organizational activities. The most important of these is criminal law. The crime of
manslaughter can, for example, be committed by a corporation. It is rare for companies
to be convicted of this offence, although prosecutions for “regulatory offences” are
common. In the USA, Europe and the UK a growing body of law has been established
to protect the environment (Watson and Emery, 2003). Much of this resembles
traditional criminal law. Offences are created, defences are recognised, and sanctions
for non-compliance are specified. The need for environmental protection then is
established in law. We will argue that, despite the proliferation of environmental law in
recent decades, most organizations that commit environmental crimes are unlikely to
be prosecuted, and that when they are the sentences are often so trivial as to be
derisory. This would suggest that the organization following a rational economic
approach would evade the law and continue to pollute because it would be cost
effective to do so. Its managers would be making rational choices as rational polluters.
Nonetheless, as Cohen notes in our opening quotation, the overwhelming majority of
organizations comply with the law. Are such firms behaving irrationally? We will
suggest that this apparently irrational behaviour in the context of the rational polluter
model can be explained using a different explanatory perspective, that of legitimacy
theory. Both these theoretical frameworks have been used by academics to explain the
response of individuals and organizations to legislation. For, example the rational
polluter model has been offered to explain environmental offences, and there have been
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attempts to apply rationalism to a range of criminal behaviour and the setting of the
appropriate level of fine (Becker, 1968; Cohen, 1992; Posner, 1985, 1998; Spence, 2001).
The legitimacy model has appeared in the organizational and accounting literature that
deals with corporate social responsibility (Gray et al., 1995; Savage et al., 2001). Our
view is that the rational polluter model can offer only a partial view of organizational
behaviour in response to environmental legislation at best, and that there is a growing
body of evidence to suggest that organizations that comply with environmental laws
may be driven by patterns of behaviour that are explained by legitimacy theory.
The rational polluter model
The rational polluter model is rooted in economic theory. Economics is the study of the
distribution of scarce resources within a society that has unlimited wants: this is
known as the economic problem. Or, as one Nobel laureate puts it:
Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or without the use of
money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce
various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among
various people and groups in society. It analyzes the costs and benefits of improving patterns
of resource allocation (Samuelson, 1973, p. 3).
This economic problem is present in all societies and whilst it is possible to find
examples of different economic systems, the dominant economic ideology of the West
is that of market capitalism. The central feature is a process of exchange carried out in
markets. In modern society goods or services are exchanged for money. The supplier
sells the goods at a price that covers all his costs, including profit, which, is the return
necessary to keep the supplier in that line of production. It is the pursuit of profit that
leads the producer to bring the goods to market. This is the self-interested approach
that Adam Smith (1723-1790) believed contributed the greatest good to society, because
each manufacturer in bringing goods to market to make a profit will be:
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it (Smith, 1976, p. 456).
An individual supplier of goods will seek to derive the maximum profit. The purchaser
or consumer will seek to maximize his/her utility. Of course we must not forget the
factors of production – land, labour and capital – and a broader description of the
above process is offered by Robinson (1970, p. 58):
Each employer of factors seeks to minimize the cost of his product and to maximize his own
return, each particle of a factor seeks the employment that maximizes its income and each
consumer plans his consumption to maximize utility. There is one equilibrium position in
which each individual is doing the best for himself, so that no one has any incentive to move.
The implication of this is that all parties are behaving rationally, although in the case
of the consumer the term utility is a metaphysical concept posing as a measurement.
What is frequently absent from such analysis is the issue of unequal power relations in
such exchanges. It has been noted that: “the resources that people bring to their social
relations are rarely equal. The outcome of any particular exchange, therefore, will
depend upon the relative power of participants” (Scott, 1999).
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This broadly then is the economic model. The key assumption is that both the
supplier and the consumer make rational choices. The supplier will seek to sell
products that yield the most profit and the consumer will seek to buy those goods that
maximize utility. The success of the economic model in terms of its explanatory
power-led sociologists and political scientists to adopt the economic emphasis on
rationalism and develop what has become known as rational choice theory.
However, a link between the law and the positivist thinking of the rationalist school
was established in the early days of rationalist thinking. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
had a keen interest in both economics and the law, but especially the law. It was to
English law, which he believed lacked a scientific basis, that he applied his “felicific
calculus”. The Benthamite approach to crime and punishment underpins the thinking
of more recent scholars like Becker (1968), Cohen (1992) and Posner (1985). Becker like
Bentham, Beccaria and other early criminologists, stressed the importance of certainty
of punishment (Jones, 1986, pp. 35 and 69). But, as Ross Harrison explains in his brief
outline of Bentham’s thought:
[. . .] punishment is not retribution for past action, but prevention of future harms; obedience
to the state is not because of some past promise, but to prevent future harms (in Honderich,
1995, pp. 85-8).
This preventative approach is generally consistent with modern legal thinking on
environmental protection.
Rationality in the social science discipline was augmented when the economist
Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) introduced mathematics. He claimed that it was possible to
express any economic decision in quantitative terms and that this approach “. . . made
irrelevant the vague generalities that had characterised economics up to that point”.
Likewise the problem of uncertainty could be dealt with by making estimations of the
probability of an event occurring (Bernstein, 1996, p. 190). This approach is echoed by
those like Becker (1968) who apply mathematical economic models to the legal aspects
of modern environmental problems.
In 1940 Phelan employed a form of rational choice theory. He suggested that a
“robber is a tradesman who, from economics or other motivation, chooses a trade with
greater rewards and dangers than navvying” (Phelan, 1940, p. 178). Like any other
economic actor it is assumed that the robber weighs the benefits of his trade against
the costs in the same manner a producer would make decisions about which product to
produce. In the language of economics, both would maximize their profits by
producing an output where marginal revenue was equal to marginal cost. In behaving
like this both are making rational choices.
Since Phelan, scholars have continued to apply economic models to the study of
crime and punishment. Some have employed the approach in attempts to determine the
correct sentence to deter the rational criminal from indulging in criminal acts. The
more punitive the sentence the greater the cost to the criminal of his or her actions.
Richard Posner – a leading authority in this field – notes that:
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from bypassing
the system of voluntary compensated exchange – the market . . . Much of this market
bypassing cannot be deterred by tort law . . . The optimal damages that would be required for
deterrence would so frequently exceed the offender’s ability to pay that public enforcement
and non-monetary sanctions such as imprisonment are required (Posner, 1985, pp. 1193,
1195).
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Clearly then the rational polluter follows the same economic logic as the robber in
Phelan’s work in so far as he/she will weigh the marginal benefit received from
imposing on society the environmental damage caused by pollution against the
marginal cost of the ensuing fines or custodial sentences. The recent literature, which
takes a broadly economic approach to the environment and the law, has focused on the
appropriate level of deterrence, the impact of environmental crime on an organization’s
profitability, and more recently, on why organizations comply with environmental
laws. The debate centres on the motives driving organizations (and individuals) to
commit environmental crimes. Or, looked at from the opposite side, the motives for not
committing crimes.
As we have seen, from a utilitarian perspective, organizations may be seen as
rational polluters. Following the marginalist principle they will seek to maximize
profits (or some other return) by equating marginal revenue with marginal cost. The
environment will only receive consideration if pollution imposes a cost on the
organization; otherwise pollution is an externality, a cost borne by society that does not
appear on the organization’s profit and loss account (Emery, 2002). Since pollution is an
externality then it can only be internalised, and therefore become a cost to the producer,
it the state imposes legislation.
Spence (2001) illustrates this with a simple mathematical model of the rational
polluter:
E NCð Þ ¼ S  pF 
where:
E(NC) = the expected value of non-compliance.
S = the economic benefit (Spence defines economic benefit as deriving from
“savings associated with non-compliance, such as the money saved by
taking fewer steps to minimize pollution, failing to monitor, or failing to
report as required by law”).
pF = the expected costs of non-compliance.
p = the probability that violation will be detected.
F = equals the expected monetary penalty if detected.
The conclusions derived from this model are that, ceteris paribus, if E(NC) is negative
then the rational polluter will comply with the law and if positive will violate the law.
This is consistent with economic theory, which would predict that the rational
polluter will continue to pollute up to the point where the marginal cost of doing so is
equal to the marginal benefit. To pollute beyond this point would mean that the
marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit.
A simplified Becker model
An alternative perspective is offered by Becker (1968) who looks at “optimal penalties”
for crime. Like other economic approaches he uses probability to arrive at his
conclusions. Cohen (1992) offers a much simplified view of the model. The conclusion
he derives from it is that penalties “should be set equal to the net social cost of the
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crime divided by the probability of detection”. This is a general model that can be
applied to the rational polluter. It is stated mathematically as:
PN ¼ NSC
p
where:
PN = penalty.
NSC = net social cost.
p = probability of detection.
We may demonstrate the effects of this by examining the situation where the net social
cost of a pollution event is £100,000. If we consider a sliding scale of probabilities then
the penalties shown in Table I may apply.
It can be seen that if the probability of detection is 0.1 then the fine will be
£1,000,000. As the probability approaches zero, the fine approaches infinity. What this
suggests is that where the probability of detection is low very severe penalties will be
necessary to ensure compliance with the law. However, if the probability is 1, then
detection is certain and the fine will be £100,000, equal to the net cost to society (it is
assumed that the £100,000 fine includes the costs of detection and prosecution). This
perspective supports the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
gravity-based approach (Emery and Watson, 2003). If Becker’s approach is followed
the implications are that the closer the probability of detection approaches zero the
higher the fine.
Problems with the rational approach
There are problems with the rational choice approach in law and economics. The first
of these concerns the critique that has been levelled at rational choice theory and is
pertinent in the context of the rational polluter model. One of the problems concerns
collective action. The rationalist perspective in economics focuses on the individual.
When referring to an organization we are dealing with a complex collective – not the
individual entrepreneur who is the basis of most of the basic models. This is a problem
Probability NSC (£) Fine (£)
0.01 100,000 10,000,000
0.1 100,000 1,000,000
0.2 100,000 500,000
0.3 100,000 333,333
0.4 100,000 250,000
0.5 100,000 200,000
0.6 100,000 166,667
0.7 100,000 142,857
0.8 100,000 125,000
0.9 100,000 111,111
1 100,000 100,000 Table I.
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that has been recognized by economists (Cyert and March, 1963) and sociologists who
have doubts about the application of rational choice theory in their discipline. Can a
collective behave in the same way as an individual in exercising rational choice? Some
sociologists believe that there is a strong non-rational element that drives collective
decision making (Parsons, 1937; Blau, 1964; Cooke and Emerson, 1978). Although
Coleman (1990), while recognizing the difference between individuals and groups, does
not see this as sufficient to refute the rational choice perspective. It may be that the
rational polluter model holds for small firms where the decision-making power is in the
hands of one individual, but the complexity of larger organizations means that the
model does not offer a good explanation of their behaviour.
All this suggests that, whilst economic theory offers a powerful analytical
explanation of behaviour its practical application may be limited and it may fail to
provide an adequate explanation of why some organizations do not pollute even
though the probability of being caught is very low. The problem with marginal
analysis is related to information. The approach is derived from the neo-classical or
Marshallian Theory of the Firm. In this context organizations are assumed to
maximise profits by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue. Part of the
difficulty with this approach is that it assumes that organizations are profit
maximisers, or to be more precise the individual entrepreneur is a profit maximiser.
This perspective has been challenged (Cyert and March, 1963; Baumol, 1971;
Williamson, 1964, 1970). In addition, it is assumed that there is full data on costs that
enable them to maximise profits when this is unlikely. In these circumstances
rationality is bounded:
When . . . transactions are conducted under conditions of uncertainty/complexity, in which
event it is very costly, perhaps impossible to describe the complete decision tree, the bounded
rationality constraint is binding and an assessment of alternative organizational modes, in
efficiency respects becomes necessary (Williamson, 1983, p. 23).
The above point may be unimportant in an abstract model, but may acquire
significance in the context of policy decisions. Many organizations cannot predict the
behaviour of their costs and revenues as the theory suggests because they are data
constrained. Alternatively, the reality might be that such a data collection exercise
might be too complex and too expensive. In both cases organizations are unlikely to be
in a position to equate the marginal cost of pollution with the marginal benefit. The
economist who supports this perspective will dismiss these criticisms as unimportant.
Legitimacy theory
The rational polluter model is deeply rooted in Newtonian physics that sought to
reduce the world to a set of mathematical laws. As already mentioned, the nineteenth
century economist Stanley Jevons was convinced that the same mathematics that gave
physicists their powerful tools, could be used by economists to explain the social world:
It seems perfectly clear that Economy, if it is to be a science at all, must be a mathematical
science . . . I know not when we shall have a perfect system of statistics, but the want of it is
the only insuperable obstacle in the way of making Political Economy an exact Science (cited
in Robinson, 1970, p. 65).
In its turn much of social science, of which the study of organizations and management
is a part, has sought a similar certainty from scientific method. None other than
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Mintzberg has been accused of following Newtonian thinking in constructing his
perspectives of organizations (Tsoukas, 1998). In addition, a large number of
sociologists have attempted to apply the rationality of economics and developed
rational choice theory (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1973, 1990; Cooke and Emerson, 1978).
There is an interesting circularity in that at least one economist is now suggesting that
this approach by sociologists is as a way forward from the rigid rationalism of the
model of competitive equilibrium! For example, Ormerod (1994), referring to the work
of sociologist James Coleman, suggests that “. . . economists . . . might have a great deal
to learn from sociologists”.
However, some academics are now arguing that the rationalist perspective is limited
in its explanatory power. The complexity of modern (post-modern?) organizations
cannot be captured and explained by the Newtonian paradigm. It is suggested that the
behaviours of such organizations are best captured and explained by chaos theory and
poststructuralism, and the application of what Tsoukas has referred to as “chaotics”
(an attitude towards the complexity of chaos rather than chaos theory itself). This is
because “. . . chaotics fosters a new awareness of dynamic processes; it encourages a
positive attitude towards unpredictability and novelty; it reconciles order and disorder;
and it invites us to rethink the character of human intervention in the social and
natural world”. “Naı¨ve rationalism is out; reflexive reason is in” (Tsoukas, 1998, p. 294).
Other writers have provided evidence of groups undermining “. . . the discourse
according to the tenets of reason and rationality” (Welcomer et al., 2000, p. 1175). They
have suggested that:
Postmodern thinkers break with the Enlightenment project and proclaim the importance not
of the modern state, but of the grass-roots, communal organization among hitherto
marginalized and underrepresented groups [where] emotion and intuition combine with
rationality as guides to action (Welcomer et al., 2000, p. 1177).
There are a number of alternatives to the rational polluter model which may be used to
explain environmental compliance. These approaches include explanations based on:
cultural differences; agency theory; political economy theory; issue life cycle theory;
and legitimacy theory (Adams et al., 1998; Cohen, 1992; Deegan, 2002; Gray et al., 1995;
Nasi et al., 1996; Savage et al., 2001; Spence, 2001). We believe the most useful in the
context of environmental pollution and in terms of explanatory power is legitimacy
theory. The theory has its roots in the seminal work of Weber (1996). Such an approach
offers a cogent explanation of why organizations may wish to stay within the law. The
theory suggests that organizations exist by the consent of society via a social contract.
If an organization breaks this social contract then its “. . . survival will be threatened
. . .” (Deegan, 2002, p. 293). If the organization wishes to continue to exist then it will
need to be legitimised by society. It has been suggested that the existing legal
framework provides a proxy for the terms of the social contract (Gray et al., 1996).
There are a number of definitions of legitimacy theory but Dowling and Pfeffer’s
(1975, p. 122) will suffice:
. . . a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual
or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy.
If there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy because a legitimacy gap has emerged (the
entity’s value system and society’s is incongruent) then action must be taken to change
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that position. The organization is faced with four potential choices: it can maintain the
status quo, that is carry on as usual but change society’s perception of the organization
through education and information; where it cannot change society’s perception it can
try to change the way the organisation’s business performance is described to make it
congruent with society’s perception; endeavour to change society’s expectations of the
organization through education and information; or change its activities to ensure they
are congruent with society.
But why are organizations concerned with legitimacy? The following reasons have
been suggested:
. Organizations are concerned with legitimacy because it is essential for their
long-term survival.
. Legitimacy is not derived from economic success or legality, although it bears a
relationship to both.
. Legitimacy challenges relate to the visibility of the organization to society (i.e.,
the larger the corporation, the greater the level of public scrutiny), and to how
heavily it depends on social and political support.
. Legitimacy is a conferred status, always controlled by those outside the
organization. It is more apparent when it is absent than when it is present
(Savage et al., 2001, p. 26).
The work of other writers, who may be classified as institutional theorists, lends
support to the legitimacy perspective. Powell and DiMaggio (1983, 1991) for example,
refer to coercive institutional pressures on organizations emanating from laws and
regulators, cultural or normative pressures, and mimetic pressures where
organizations emulate other organizations. Scott (1999) argues that organizations
develop shared perceptions of reality, but are influenced by the external environment
through laws, regulators and the courts; but perhaps most importantly by public
opinion. Organizations that claim to be acting rationally are often taking subjective not
objective decisions but justifying their behaviour with rationalised myths (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977).
Organizations will adopt a number of strategies to exploit their cultural
environment. These may be substantive or symbolic (Savage et al., 2001, pp. 26-7).
Substantive strategy “involves real, material change in organisational goals, structures
and processes, or in socially institutionalised practices” whereas symbolic strategies do
not allow the organization to continue without changes its behaviour, it portrays its
activities “so that they seem compatible with social norms and values” (Savage et al.,
2001, pp. 26-7).
There are three substantive strategies. These include “role performance” where an
organization will change its goals, role, methods and activities to conform with
society’s expectations; “coercive isomorphism” where organizations, by an
evolutionary process that aligns the organization’s values with societal values
“sacrifice efficiency for external legitimacy . . . as a buffer against failure”; and
“altering socially institutionalised practices”, in effect changing society’s perception of
what is legitimate (Savage et al., 2001, pp. 27-8). In addition, there are symbolic
strategies that include misrepresentation, espousal of legitimacy, denial, identifying
with symbols that confer legitimacy, apologies, admissions of guilt, excuses and
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justifications, ceremonial conformity, and evasion. A combination of these strategies
may be use to close a legitimacy gap.
Symbolic strategies are not only a way of dealing with legitimacy, but also a means
of repositioning society’s perception of risk without actually dealing with the
symptoms. Such strategies offer a cosmetic approach, “. . . reducing the symptoms of
pollutants, installing filters while retaining the sources of filth” (Beck, 1992, p. 57). For
Beck, the management of risk in society is synonymous with the management of
legitimacy. Legislators may define acceptable levels of pollution but such measures
only “. . . fulfill the function of a symbolic detoxification” (Beck, 1992, p. 68).
For some risk as Beck interprets it is “A particular kind of sign . . .” (Tsoukas, 1999,
p. 501). A sign because such risks are not of the traditional kind but “. . . only exist
insofar as they can be pointed out in scientific theorizing and experimentation”
(Tsoukas, 1999, p. 501). But these risks are important and they must be interpreted and
mediated in order that organizations can achieve “symbolic power (legitimacy)
. . .”(Tsoukas, 1999, p. 523). Tsoukas offers as a case study the events surrounding
Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar. The interpretation placed upon these events is that
Shell was involved in a symbolic strategy to close a legitimacy gap that had been
opened by Greenpeace and environmentalists.
The growth of environmental law
In Britain, North America and the European Community environmental law emerged
as recently as the 1970s. The growth of environmental law is a continuing process, and
it is difficult to state with precision what the law is, or easily predict what it is likely to
be in the future. These difficulties are compounded by the recognised complexity
present in this aspect of law. According to Orts (1995, p. 1240):
The amount of environmental law and regulation in the United States alone is staggering. Not
counting state statutes and common law, there are over one hundred separate environmental
statutes at the federal level. The texts of seven major federal environmental statutes run to
several thousand pages. Accompanying regulations stretch for several feet on a library shelf
. . . It is fair to say that no single individual can possibly “know” all of the environmental law
out there, even if one’s attention is limited only to United States law.
English environmental law could be described in similar terms (Bell and McGillivray,
2000, pp. 60-64). Small wonder then that “relatively few” small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) “have any knowledge of environmental legislation or its trajectory”,
or that only 13 per cent of them understood the duty of care concept that underlies
British waste legislation (Baylis et al., 1998, p. 287).
This lack of knowledge and understanding is reinforced by the uncertainty that is
engendered by the wide discretion available to the officials responsible for
enforcement. Fineman’s (1998, pp. 969-71) study of the Environment Agency of
England and Wales is instructive:
The field inspector’s “street-level” bureaucracy is a far cry from the Weberian image of
monolithic rules and standardized procedures. It is more an exercise in careful ritual and
improvisation, where personal style, dramatic skill, emotion and a degree of bluff are used to
put flesh on the regulatory skeleton . . . Like many street-level bureaucrats, the environmental
inspector lionizes the field . . . It is “out there” in, and with, industry where the real business
occurs and where environmental legislation is cut down to size and made workable; so much
so that some inspectors pay scant attention to changes in environmental law . . .
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Inspectors would presumably behave less capriciously and have less freedom in
decision-making if the Environment Agency had a coherent perception of its role. A
recent survey of its employees revealed that only 2 per cent “agreed strongly” with the
view that the Agency had a “clear vision and direction” (Bell and Gray, 2002, p. 78;
ENDS Report, 1999, pp. 5-6; Watson, 2003, pp. 50-52).
Despite the plethora and complexity of the law on the environment, polluting the
environment is not an offence per se.Most environmental offences are committed when
standards are violated. As these standards are designed to protect human health and
the environment they are generally set at precautionary levels that are well below the
levels at which significant harm is likely to be caused. Although a discharge of
pollution into a river may have potentially catastrophic consequences, such outcomes
are rare. The significance of this is explained by Lazarus (1994, p. 881):
The public . . . may believe that such precautionary levels are wise and appropriate, but that
presents a far different public policy issue than whether all such violations rise to a level
justifying severe criminal . . . sanctions.
As a result, environmental law generally follows a command and control approach and
tends to be “aspirational”; that is “it seeks to bring about radical change in human
behaviour to minimise environmental degradation and hazards to public health”
(Brickey, 1996,p. 498). Ambitious targets are set which are highly unlikely to be
achieved. Brickey (1996, pp. 499-500) cites as an example America’s Clean Air Act
1970:
Attaining the necessary air-quality standards for ozone in the South Coast basin that
surrounds Los Angeles . . . would have required prohibiting all traffic, shutting down major
business activity, and imposing other draconian constraints on the region’s social and
economic life . . . By mandating unattainable goals environmental laws impose
extraordinarily high standards and simultaneously ensure the inability of the regulated
community to comply.
Environmental laws then are complex, and if enforced fully would lead to
dysfunctional economic consequences. Furthermore, both the organizations that are
required to obey such laws, and those bodies required to enforce them, have only a
limited understanding of what is required of them. How then do organizations respond
to environmental laws?
Organizations and environmental law
It is clear that a number of organizations thrive on the confusion inherent in the
legislation and among the enforcing bodies, and act in an antisocial manner, or as
rational polluters. Support for such an approach is offered by the paltry level of
penalties imposed on offenders against environmental laws, which keep the marginal
cost of pollution low. For example, in 1992 Alan Race, a skip-hire operator, was
prosecuted after dumping 70,000 tonnes of waste on a site in Gorton in the North West
of England. His customers had been charged £30 per skip load. Manchester
magistrates fined him £20. Race was understandably undeterred by his conviction. He
continued to pollute the site and in January 1994 received a 90-day custodial sentence.
This was only the third custodial sentence that had ever been imposed by a British
court for an environmental offence (ENDS Report, 1992, 1994). Individuals, like Race,
probably consider themselves to be below the horizon of public approbation and
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therefore unconcerned with social legitimacy, but their actions are consistent with the
rational polluter model. Until he received the custodial sentence it is likely that the
marginal benefits to Race from pollution were considerably above the costs inflicted by
the courts.
The case is not exceptional. Robert Stanley James, his son Simon Craig James, and
his daughter Nicola Louise James were recently convicted of 11 offences relating to the
operation of an unlicensed landfill site and waste transfer station near Barry, South
Wales. Their company was convicted of a further eight offences. It appears that
members of the family and their company received approximately £85,000 after
allowing thousands of tonnes of building site and skip waste to be illegally dumped on
their property. Total fines amounted to £830. It seems hardly worth stating the
behaviour here is entirely rational in the context of the rational polluter model (ENDS
Report, 2002, p. 53).
In fact the actions of the courts seem positively to encourage organizations to take a
rational polluter approach to environmental pollution. For example, the average
company fine for an environmental offence rose from £6,800 in 1999 to £8,532 in 2000
(ENDS Report, 2001, p. 13). The median fine is much lower, especially when fines
awarded to sole traders are taken into account. When companies are prosecuted for
environmental offences the results are often highly unsatisfactory (Watson, 2002).
According to one authority: “existing judicial sanctions for non-compliance with
environmental laws are unreliable, unascertainable and in some cases impotent” (De
Prez, 2000a, p. 20).
Although courts appear to be taking environmental offences more seriously than
was once the case, the current level of fines is clearly of limited deterrent value to large
companies who take a rationalist stance. Sir John Harman, chairman of the UK
Environment Agency, has said that organizations will only understand the true value
of the environment if fines are increased substantially. With penalties at current levels
organizations are encouraged to take risks (ENDS Report, 2001).
But why are fines so low? Most environmental offences are strict liability crimes. As
there is generally no need to prove that the polluter intentionally, recklessly or
negligently causes environmental damage, the task of the prosecutor should be
relatively straightforward. In theory it should be easy to punish offenders. The reality
is rather different. A study of 25 court cases by De Prez (2000b, pp. 67-8) suggests that:
Strict liability acts as a cloak for many defendants, for as the prosecutor is not required to
prove “fault”, this leaves defence counsel plenty of room to deny culpability in order to attract
the sympathy of the bench. This strategy took the form of blaming misfortune and third
parties for the offence or asserting that, given that the offence was not deliberate, enforcement
was an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade.
De Prez refers to the “ritual trivialisation of environmental prosecutions”. She also
claims that the defendants she studied:
[. . .] tended to employ an aggressive style of defence and mitigation. This confrontational
style of advocacy often led to detailed analysis of scientific or technical issues relating to the
impact of a pollutant or to the reliability of the Agency’s evidence (De Prez, 2000b).
However, De Prez’s perspective suggests an alternative explanation for organizations’
behaviour, an explanation that is rooted in legitimacy theory. The behaviour she refers
to strongly suggests that such organizations are indulging in symbolic legitimacy
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strategies, which we have seen include misrepresentation and denial, and an espousal
of legitimate behaviour. The fact that most lay magistrates are not well equipped to
deal with such cases facilitates the implementation of these strategies. Sentencing
consequently tends to be rather lenient. In 1998, for example, English magistrates
imposed the maximum fine available to them (£20,000) on just one occasion
(Parpworth, 2000, p. 596). This enables offending organizations to point to the fine as
an indication that their misdemeanour was trivial and attempt to close the legitimacy
gap by admissions of guilt, apologies, excuses and ceremonial conformity.
While the reality is that there are little hard data on non-compliance in the USA and
the UK, the evidence from the courts suggests that some organizations are not deterred
from environmental crime by modest fines. We suggest that in the case of larger
organizations they may appear to be behaving as rational polluters but are in fact
indulging in symbolic legitimacy strategies. Indeed, the positivist approach, with its
emphasis on organizations’ avoidance behaviour, obfuscates a key point – most
organizations obey the law. What drives them to do so when the probability of
detection and fine is limited? Why do they not all behave in manner similar to Alan
Race? We can assume that since small fines do not deter such organizations they
cannot be acting according to the rational polluter model. If this is the case, they are
deterred by something else. We suggest that such organizations are driven by
substantive legitimacy strategies, and these organizations continually reposition their
organizational goals, structures and processes to remain within the law by closing any
emerging legitimacy gaps.
Enforcing the law: inspection regimes
Most “real crimes” are investigated by the police. Although police officers have
considerable discretion when dealing with minor incidents, most are personally
committed to the principle of law enforcement. They are therefore generally willing to
charge those who appear to have committed serious offences. It would be wrong to
assume that the inspectors employed by bodies such as the Environment Agency have
a similar role. Inspectors are generally only willing to consider prosecution for
environmental offences as a last resort, although this may not be so in the case of an
offending angler. There is a well-documented tendency for regulatory bodies to
concentrate on the relatively trivial offences of small-scale operators rather than the
more serious offences committed by large corporations (Diver, 1980; De Prez, 2001).
The Environment Agency for England and Wales does not appear to be an exception
to the rule. Although only about 1 per cent of the water quality incidents identified by
the Agency lead to prosecutions, the Agency effectively adopts a zero tolerance policy
to anglers who are caught fishing without licences (De Prez, 2000c, p. 86; Watson, 2003,
p. 50). It is the Environment Agency’s official policy that serious (Category 1) pollution
incidents should normally lead to a prosecution. Yet in April 2001 a leaked internal
report revealed that there were prosecutions in just 23 per cent of such cases (ENDS
Report, 2001).
Fineman has recently produced a study of 82 Environment Agency managers and
inspectors. According to Fineman (2000, p. 64):
Most respondents were keen to present themselves as “middle ground” – neither “radical
environmentalist” nor “radical industrialist” . . . Those few who admitted to deep green
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commitments were disappointed with the lack of reinforcement for their values within the
Agency.
A total of 20 of the respondents were involved with integrated pollution control
(Fineman, 2000, p. 65):
All but three IPC inspectors took a reactionary position on the place of industry in society.
Indeed, as many of them were recruited from the very sectors they now regulated, this was
not entirely surprising.
Inspectors usually devote their limited resources to providing advice and seeking
voluntary compliance. Prosecutions are time-consuming and create unhelpful
antagonisms.
Similarly in the early 1980s, 96 Australian regulatory agencies were investigated.
The research, like Fineman’s, suggested regulatory capture:
[T]hose agencies whose inspectors are recruited predominantly from industry tend to be less
prosecutorial than those whose inspectors are without prior industry experience . . . [This can]
be interpreted as support for the theory of “capture” when industry penetrates regulatory
agencies (Grabotsky and Braithwaite, 1986, pp. 207-10).
These approaches to environmental regulation may appear to be examples of
regulatory capture, but are they? Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) offer an economic
perspective that suggests such bargaining is cost effective and provides a rationale for
behaviour that negates the regulatory capture perspective. This view is supported by
other researchers who suggest that there is a need for regulators to offer
encouragement to organizations to comply with environmental regulation and that a
punitive approach will freeze regulators into a relationship that is rooted in conflict
(Ruhnka and Boerstler, 1998). The suggestion here is that co-operation is more likely to
be effective in achieving compliance than head-to-head conflict. If so then this
represents a rationalist approach to organizational behaviour and is not an example of
regulatory capture.
But this could be interpreted differently within the framework of legitimacy theory.
A form of pragmatic legitimacy may explain the relationship between the enforcers of
environmental laws and potential lawbreakers. Given that exchange legitimacy is one
aspect of pragmatic legitimacy, we suggest that the regulator and the regulated are
involved in a form of exchange and that these groups are mutually dependent on each
other for survival. If this is the case then “. . . exchange legitimacy shades into a . . .
variant of more conventional, materialistic power-dependence relations” (Suchman,
1995, p. 578). As such there is a nice distinction between an act of economic rationalism
and legitimising behaviour.
The law, legitimacy theory and economic outcomes
Oganizations that avoid breaking environmental laws may be driven by the desire to
remain congruent with society’s value system and apply a form of legitimacy theory to
realign society’s perception or change their activities. They may do this by
implementing environmental accounting systems and publishing detailed
environmental accounts, as well as eschewing activities that bring them in conflict
with environmental laws. It may be surmised that large organizations will feel it more
necessary to acquire the approbation of society than small ones, or at least have the
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apparatus to tutor society into accepting that they are remaining within their social
contract.
However, even if we accept legitimacy theory as a better (or at least equally
powerful) descriptor of organizational behaviour than the rational polluter model,
indulging in behaviour that establishes and maintains legitimacy will have economic
outcomes. These outcomes may include increased turnover, continuity, the avoidance
of litigation, and the avoidance of environmental investigation – a process that is not
cost free.
In fact there are a number of reasons why organizations may follow legitimacy
strategies both substantive and symbolic, most of which have an economic outcome.
For example, there is evidence that poor environmental performance is punished by a
decline in the company’s share price, but environmental disclosure, which helps close
or prevent the opening of an organization’s legitimacy gap, can be beneficial. Such
evidence supports the view that organizations that disclose environmental information
in their financial reports are likely to fare better in financial markets following an
environmental disaster than those who do not offer any such information, or offer less
(Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). Other research has demonstrated a link between
corporate financial performance and social performance. The link, however, is in that
direction – that is, a strong financial performance provides the slack for a strong
socially responsible policy (Waddock and Graves, 1997). This suggests that successful
organizations are more likely to pursue legitimising environmental practices than the
less successful. Other research concludes that there is no incompatibility “between
environmental virtue and financial reward” (Bragdon and Martin, 1972, p. 17).
Nevertheless, in the past some organizations may have been unwilling to pursue
legitimising environmental practices because they feared it damaged their
competitiveness abroad. Again, research has demonstrated that this may not the
case (Jaffe et al., 1995).
An interesting aspect of compliance that illustrates the complexity of organizations
relates to a situation where different stakeholders may have different perspectives on
environmental practices. There may, for example, be a dichotomy between the desires
of the senior management of an organization and the owners. Senior managers may
wish to instigate appropriate environmental practices but this may conflict with the
profit maximising objective of shareholders. In such cases it does not pay a chief
executive officer (CEO) to be green (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001). In the current
climate, where environmental rectitude is prized, it might be posited that such CEOs
will find an emerging legitimacy gap difficult to deal with. But, on the other hand,
empirical evidence has been provided that suggests where it is in the best interests of
shareholders to comply with environmental laws and top management are closely
aligned with shareholders, then organizations are less likely to pollute (Alexander and
Cohen, 1998). In such cases any emerging legitimacy gap will be easier to deal with.
Rational polluter – the wrong premise?
We argue that many organizations do not take decisions to pollute that are firmly
based on a process of ratiocination, but simply do so as a result of accident. In the USA
and UK this is not surprising owing largely to the complexity of environmental
regulations and enforcement procedures. An implication of this is that environmental
regulations based on the perspective of the rational polluter may be beginning from an
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incorrect premise. Indeed, such a policy may be self-defeating and damaging to
resource allocation. This may be the reason why researchers have found that far from
organizations acting as maximisers they indulge in a form of co-operation with
environmental regulators (Fineman, 2000).
A further example of the rational polluter model being an inappropriate premise for
legislation may be found in our summary of the Becker model where we showed that it
is possible where the mathematical approach is used for the fine to far outweigh the
environmental consequences. If applied in a court of law, this mechanistic approach
may have serious dysfunctional economic consequences. This is because
environmental pollution is a by-product of a legal activity that generates economic
welfare. A small organization might estimate the probability of being caught as very
low, and yet nonetheless find itself brought before the court for an environmental
crime. If, as in our table, the net social cost is £100,000 and the probability is 0.1 then
the organization will face a fine of £1,000,000. Such a fine may drive the organization
out business with the consequential loss of economic welfare. Where the organization
was unable to pay such a fine then its owners or managers might find themselves
imprisoned. In the early nineteenth century when the death penalty was extent for over
200 offences juries were reluctant to convict (Hay, 1977). Draconian penalties for
environmental offences might have a similar outcome and be unworkable in extreme
cases as the above example demonstrates. Apart from the reluctance of the authorities
to enforce such large fines there would be serious resource misallocation.
In any event, this approach to criminal liability is clearly less easy to apply to “real”
offences than to regulatory offences. Posner (1985) therefore, distinguishes between
unconditional and conditional deterrence. Robbery, a real offence, can never be justified
and must be deterred unconditionally. But, as we have seen, some degree of pollution is
a natural consequence of industrial activity, and a policy of unconditional deterrence
might have very serious economic implications. Cohen (1992) argues that regulatory
violations are usually conditionally deterred offences “since society benefits from the
underlying activity which gives rise to the regulatory violation”. Nevertheless, this
brings with it the obvious risk of over-deterrence:
We do not, for example, want to raise the “price” of causing an oil spill so high that we deter
organizations from engaging in the socially beneficial practice of oil transportation. Neither
do we want oil transporters to spend more than a socially desirable amount of resources on oil
spill prevention safeguards. The problem is especially acute in the case of strict liability
crimes for “stochastic externalities”, such as oil spills, where the incident itself is not entirely
controllable by either the organization or its employees (Cohen, 1992, p. 1062).
Conclusion
Environmental offences occur when standards are violated and the law generally
follows what is usually referred to as a command and control approach. Environmental
law is relatively new and certainly complex. Attempts have been made to model crime
and punishment and these models have been applied to environmental law. A common
approach is to use an economic model, the rational polluter, which describes the
response of organizations to environmental legislation. The rational polluter model is
not without value but at best it may offer a partial explanation of organizational
behaviour and at worst an inappropriate premise for legislation. There is a real danger
that laws based on such premises may be brought into disrepute. Environmental law is
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enforced by regulators who have considerable sympathy with those they monitor.
Prosecution is seen as a last resort and fines are of little commercial significance to
large and medium sized companies. Nevertheless, most organizations are law abiding
and we need to explain their behaviour. We believe a better understanding of such
behaviour is gained through the explanatory power of the legitimacy model. The desire
for social legitimacy and a positive corporate image are highly valued commodities.
Perhaps they are of greater significance than any monetary penalties that magistrates
are likely to impose. In order to confirm our hypothesis further research into how
organizations behave in response to environmental legislation is required, although the
work carried out by Savage et al. (2001) lists a large number of examples of corporate
social responsibility in the context of legitimacy theory and represents a useful starting
point. Nevertheless, we believe that we have provided at least a partial answer to
Cohen’s question: “. . . why [do] firms comply with the law”?
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